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Introduction to the Symposium on Trade, Renewable Resources and Biodiversity 
Abstract 
 
  The five papers comprising the symposium on trade, renewable resources and biodiversity are 
good illustrations of a growing literature in this area that show how the design of appropriate policies 
must take into account complex interactions between ecological, economic and institutional factors.  
Only through such careful analysis can the impacts of trade on resource management and economic 
welfare be identified, and only then can possible policy remedies be recommended.  Future areas of 
research include consideration of rent seeking, lobbying and corruption; endogenous institutions and 
market development; and economic geography. 
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1. Introduction 
  On September 5-6, 2002 a workshop on “Trade, Renewable Resources and Biodiversity” was 
held at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, sponsored by the European Union-funded BIOECON 
Project.  The five papers comprising this symposium in this issue of the Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management represent some of the invited papers emerging from that workshop. 
  We believe that both the workshop and the resulting symposium of papers fill an important gap 
in the economics literature.  Although economists are increasingly examining trade-pollution linkages, 
there are relatively few contributions on trade and renewable resource management.
1 While some of 
the issues are similar (e.g., spillover benefits and costs associated with conservation, stringency of 
regulation and competitiveness on international markets, optimal trade interventions), it is clear that 
trade, renewable resource and biodiversity linkages also entail some distinct elements that present 
important policy challenges for both host countries and the international community. 
In particular, the emerging debate over the effect of trade and trade liberalization on resource 
conservation  and  welfare  in  resource-dependent  economies  has  attracted  considerable  attention  in 
international policymaking bodies, the popular media and among the interested general public.  This 
debate also poses an important challenge for economists.  For instance, the “anti-free trade” view on 
trade and renewable resource linkages argues in favor of regulated trade, whereas the conventional 
economic approach to such linkages suggests that pre-existing distortions that prevent optimal resource 
management should be  tackled instead.
2  Such  opposing views are often reflected in international 
policymaking circles.  For example, there are repeated calls for incorporating trade rules focusing on 
resource management into the World Trade organization (WTO).  However, the lack of consensus on 
the  relationship  between  international  trade  and  renewable  resource  management  hampers  the 
prospects  for  amending  existing  WTO  rules,  or  the  design  of  new  trade  treaties.    And  while 
multilaterial conventions like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild 
fauna and flora (CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have recently embraced   4
the use of economic incentives to promote sustainable and efficient use of resources and wildlife, there 
is a lack of insight into how to make progress on this front. 
There  is  a  burgeoning  economics  literature  on  trade,  renewable  resources  and  biodiversity 
issues.  A key feature highlighted by this literature is the role of institutions in resource management 
[5].  The implications of trade openness for welfare and resource conservation are greatly affected by 
this  change  in  the  institutional  context,  from  optimal  management  to  open  access  to  endogenous 
property rights.  Moreover, the nature of these effects depends on the type of renewable resource and 
biodiversity conservation policies considered.   
The  purpose  of  the  rest  of  this  introduction  to  the  symposium  papers  on  trade,  renewable 
resources and biodiversity is to indicate their potential contribution to the emerging literature.  In the 
next section, we briefly summarize the main trends in the trade and renewable resource literature.  In 
the following section we summarize the five symposium papers and identify their key contributions.  
We conclude briefly with some final remarks on future research in the economics of trade, renewable 
resources and biodiversity. 
 
2.  Key developments in the literature
3 
Compared to the literature on trade and agriculture, environment or exhaustible resources, the 
economics literature on trade and renewable resources stands apart for three reasons:  i) the key role 
played  by  the  institutional  context  as  reflected  in  the  resource  management  regime  (i.e.,  optimal 
management vs open access); ii) the inherently dynamic nature of resource management, with stock 
size adjusting over time to the opposing forces of replenishment and harvesting; and finally, iii) the 
associated complex environmental issues beyond concern with just resource extraction (e.g., habitat 
conversion, non-use values, bio-invasions, biodiversity, etc.).  Many resource stocks are not simply a 
production factor for the traded commodity; they may also contribute to the stability and productivity   5
of ecological systems that provide invaluable services to mankind, and affect the welfare of individuals 
directly. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, following the rapid spread of optimal control methods throughout the 
resource  economics  field,  most  of  the  work  on  trade  and  resource  management  assumed  the 
perspective of a benevolent planner or sole owner with secure property rights.  Assuming that there are 
no other distortions in the economy, then trade liberalization can only enhance welfare [15].  This 
comes at no surprise: removing a binding constraint to a maximization problem implies that outcomes 
can only improve.  In contrast, trade liberalization may be harmful for conserving renewable resource 
stocks locally.  For example, a common finding in the early fisheries literature is that optimal stocks 
are inversely related to the price of the resource good [7].  From this perspective, opening up for trade 
is bad for (local) conservation when world prices are higher than domestic ones (and good when the 
reverse is true).  From this perspective, restricting trade in endangered species is a good strategy for 
conservationists. 
However,  later  contributions  to  the  literature  demonstrate  that  there  are  clear  dangers  in 
translating these rather specific fisheries insights to a more general level.  The fisheries literature is 
based on the assumption that the only alternative to harvesting a fish is not harvesting it.  The case for 
terrestrial  renewable  resources  is  more  complex.    Conservation  of  most  terrestrial  species  implies 
setting aside tracts of land as habitat.  When alternative uses of the land exist, such as agriculture, the 
planner  must  consider  the  opportunity  cost  of  conservation,  and  the  incentive  to  incur  this  cost 
diminishes  as  the  price  of  the  resource  good  falls  [1,19].    The  impact  of  trade  liberalization  on 
conservation  of  terrestrial  resources  is  therefore  ambiguous,  and  depends  on  the  strength  of  two 
opposing forces – the incentive to increase harvesting and the incentive to expand the allocation of 
land to support the stock. 
When the trade and renewable resources literature shifted its focus in the 1990s to the problem 
of open access management, the unambiguous conclusion that trade liberalization is always beneficial   6
for welfare also changed.  Chichilnisky [6] drew attention to the fact that the assumption of secure 
property rights is unrealistic for many resource-exporting developing countries.  Chichilnisky shows 
that, despite the fact that neither the North nor the South has a real comparative advantage in producing 
the resource-intensive good, the lack of property rights for a common-property resource in the South 
leads it to produce and export resource-intensive goods in the steady state.  In other words, the country 
with  weak  property  rights  gains  an  apparent  comparative  advantage,  but  this  advantage  does  not 
necessarily lead to greater welfare gains, and certainly not resource conservation, from trade. 
Brander  and  Taylor  [2,3]  demonstrate  the  potential  adverse  welfare  effects  of  trade 
liberalization with open access resources in both a partial and general equilibrium setting.  Under 
autarky  too  much  harvesting  takes  place.    Opening  up  for  trade  makes  matters  worse  for  those 
countries that are resource abundant and experience a rise in the terms of trade.  In the long run, under 
certain  conditions,  a  country  that  exports  resources  initially  may  experience  declines  in  welfare 
compared to autarky.
4  Karp et al. [13,14] emphasize that multiple equilibria may occur in trade-
resource models without property rights.
5  Changes in prices may induce not only shifts of equilibria, 
but also “jumps” from one equilibrium to another.  As a result, the array of potential welfare effects of 
trade liberalization is quite rich, and one outcome might be “common ground” between the policy 
outcomes proposed by “environmentalists” as opposed to “free traders” [13].   
Current contributions in the literature are focusing on an endogenous institutional context.  The 
key assumption is that access to the renewable resource is conditional on behavior of the owner, who 
weighs benefits and costs of protecting his or her property.  For instance, Hotte et al. [12] develop a 
trade-renewable resource model with endogenous institutions, where a private resource owner must 
decide  how  much  illegal  extraction  to  tolerate.    Trade  liberalization  (higher  resource  prices)  may 
induce the owner to (i) augment enforcement effort thus raising the costs of illegal harvesting, and (ii) 
hire legal labor to lower the benefits from illegal harvesting at the margin and thereby crowd it out.  
However,  the  re-allocation  of  labor  to  manufacturing  that  follows  after  restricting  access  to  the   7
resource may adversely affect labor income elsewhere.  Hence, it is possible that trade liberalization is 
good  for  conservation  (because  of  stricter  enforcement)  but  bad  for  welfare  (because  of  adverse 
impacts on manufacturing labor income) – reversing some of the results from the early literature on 
trade and optimal renewable resource management discussed above. 
To summarize, the current literature on trade, renewable resources and biodiversity suggests 
that, while the polar extreme cases of perfect management and open access may lead to unambiguous 
welfare  and  resource  conservation  impacts  from  trade,  more  realistic  assessments  generally  imply 
ambiguous  outcomes.    The  interplay  of  economic,  ecological  and  institutional  factors  therefore 
determines whether trade is overall “good” or “bad” for welfare, or whether it will lead to conservation 
of stocks and biodiversity. The implication is that neither the strictly anti nor pro-free trade view of the 
world is a good starting point for recommending trade policies and reforms for most of the pressing 
biodiversity  and  renewable  resource  management  problems  facing  the  world  today.    Instead,  each 
specific management problem, whether it be control of ivory poaching, tropical forest conservation, 
fisheries management, limiting bioinvasions, designing certification schemes, protection of endangered 
species or preservation of biodiversity “hot spots”, must be analyzed on a case by case basis in order to 
determine the linkages between the key economic, ecological and institutional factors that are driving 
the problem.  Only through such careful analysis can the impacts of trade on resource management and 
economic welfare be identified, and only then can possible policy remedies be recommended.  
 
 3. The symposium papers 
The five papers comprising this symposium illustrate the latter points  clearly.  Each paper 
examines trade, renewable resource management and biodiversity conservation for a certain type of 
management  problem  or  resource  context,  such  as  the  implications  for  trade-induced  habitat 
conversion [17,18]; legal and illegal markets  for endangered species [9]; trade-related policies  for   8
controlling  bioinvasions  [16];  and  trade  regulation  schemes  to  support  resource  conservation  and 
protection [11]. 
Smulders et al. [18] extend the general equilibrium model of Brander and Taylor [3] to include 
the impacts of trade on a habitat-dependent natural resource.  To do this, the authors add a third sector, 
agriculture, which is responsible for habitat destruction through increased demand for land.  Trade-
induced habitat destruction therefore has two potential impacts.  Because the carrying capacity of the 
species is related directly to habitat size, for a given population a decrease in habitat reduces resource 
growth.  In addition, a smaller habitat makes the wild population easier to catch.  Both countries 
(Home and Foreign) engage in agriculture and exploit resource stocks under open access conditions, 
Foreign  is  relatively  well  endowed  with  land.    When  free  trade  occurs,  both  countries  engage  in 
manufacturing and agriculture, but resource harvesting may occur only in Foreign.  However, whereas 
Brander and Taylor [3] find that trade liberalization reduces welfare in the relatively resource-rich 
country (Foreign), Smulders et al. [18] show that this outcome depends critically on the role of habitat.  
For example, if Foreign becomes an agricultural exporter, then this sector will expand and reduce 
habitat, but this may induce short-run welfare gains if the result that wild populations are easier to 
harvest.  Similarly, both resource stocks and welfare in the long run may be higher for Foreign if it 
reduces agricultural activity but expands manufacturing rather than resource harvesting, so that habitat 
increases substantially relative to harvesting effort.  Given these complex interactions, it follows that 
the consequences of Home introducing a tariff on resource imports from Foreign may be counter-
productive in some cases, leading to declines in the total habitat of both countries.  Thus the authors 
conclude  that  such  trade  interventions  may  unintentionally  worsen  conservation  in  countries  with 
substantial habitat, that are richly endowed with biodiversity and where agriculture is an important 
source of income. 
Polasky et al. [17] employ a 2x2 specific factors trade model, in which the two production 
sectors (timber and grain) are supported by a fixed endowment and grassland.  In addition, once each   9
type of land is converted to productive use it results in irreversible loss of biodiversity through a 
species-area relationship.  Consumers consume both the produced goods and also care about species 
conservation.  Whereas opening up to trade unambiguously increases welfare from consuming the 
private goods, if the two countries have symmetric species area relationships, trade unambiguously 
reduces local biodiversity.  On the other hand, if the species area relationships across countries are 
sufficiently  asymmetric,  trade  may  increase  local  biodiversity.    The  effect  of  trade  on  global 
biodiversity depends on the degree to which species in each country are endemic.  Finally, the overall 
effects of trade on welfare under free trade depend on the weights consumers attach to the private 
goods (timber and grain) relative to species conservation, and whether local versus global biodiversity 
is valued higher. 
Using  elephant  ivory  as  an  illustration,  Fischer  [9]  distinguishes  two  markets  for  trade  in 
endangered  species:  a  market  of  certified  products  for  law-abiding  consumers  and  a  market  for 
uncertified  (i.e.  illegal)  products  for  noncompliant  consumers.    She  assumes  that  law-abiding 
consumers abhor the “stigma” associated with buying a product obtained through illegal or inhumane 
means, and thus the increased legal trade  reduces stigma.   Fischer shows that critical interactions 
between the two market, in particular the degree of “laundering” (fraudulent sale of illegal products in 
the  legal  market)  and  stigma,  are  important  determinants  as  to  the  effects  of  a  ban  on  trade  in 
endangered species.  For example, if demand from law-abiding consumers is large, stigma effects are 
weak, and laundering occurs, then an enforceable trade ban would minimize poaching.  However, if 
laundering can be eliminated, the bulk of demand comes from noncompliant consumers and stigma 
effects are strong, then allowing sales of certified products would tend to lower prices and the return 
from  poaching.    The  latter  effect  may  be  reduced,  if  certified  sales  make  poaching  easier  or 
enforcement more difficult.  Nonetheless, limited auctions could be combined with a tax on certified 
sales to eliminate the producer price discrepancy and thus the laundering incentive between legal and 
illegal supplies.   10
Noting that biological invasions may cost the United States anywhere from $5 billion to $137 
billion annually, McAusland and Costello [16] model the relationship between international trade and 
the damage from introduction of exotic species.  Trade between the importing country (Home) and an 
exporting country (Foreign) leads to contamination of some known proportion of traded goods with a 
damaging exotic invader.  Home can control this damage either through imperfect port inspections, 
where higher inspections are costly but facilitate a higher detection rate of contaminated goods, and a 
tariff on goods imported from Foreign.  A principal result of the analysis is that the optimal tariff is 
always  positive  and  set  at  the  Pigouvian  level,  equal  to  the  sum  of  expected  damages  from 
contaminated units not detected during inspections plus the costs of inspections in the first place.  The 
optimal tariff should increase with the rate of infection of goods with pests.  Home’s only incentive to 
undertake  port  inspections  is  to  minimize  the  costs  associated  with  trade  in  infected  goods,  by 
balancing the cost additional inspections and more rejections of incoming goods with the benefits of 
fewer infected units making it past inspectors.  Although at low infection rates the optimal inspection 
intensity increases with the rate of goods infection by pests, at intermediate levels of infection rates 
this relationship is reversed, and after some threshold inspections should cease altogether.  The authors 
also  find  that,  whereas  inspection  intensity  increases  unambiguously  with  a  higher  per-infection 
damage rate, the optimal tariff rate may fall rather than rise. 
Heyes  and  Maxwell  [11]  investigate  the  case  for  a  supernational  “World  Environmental 
Organization” (WEO) to set and police mandatory international environmental standards for global 
public goods, such as biodiversity, as opposed to relying on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to provide voluntary labeling schemes for environmentally friendly goods.  The two schemes may 
interact in a global market where consumers signal a willingness to pay a premium for “green” goods.  
However, the environmental attributes of a good are not directly observed by the consumers, and so the 
green premium will be paid only if trade in the undesirable good is banned or the “green” good carries 
a reputable label.  The WEO is responsible for determining the ban, whereas labeling is used by the   11
NGO.  Heyes and Maxwell [11] find that resistance by producers to any mandatory scheme proposed 
by the WEO is greater when there exists an NGO offering an alternative voluntary scheme, as the latter 
is always more attractive to the industry.  While the anticipation of industry resistance will cause the 
WEO to reduce the stringency of its proposed policy, the existence of the alternative NGO scheme 
may also encourage the WEO to be bolder in its policy proposal.  When both WEO and NGO schemes 
coexist rather than compete, the existence of the NGO always increases social welfare, whether the 
WEO’s proposal is implemented or not and through increasing the probability of implementation by 
potentially increasing producers’ surplus. 
 
4. Final remarks 
  Along  with  other  contributions  in  this  field,  the  five  papers  of  this  symposium  on  trade, 
renewable resources and biodiversity show that the interplay of economic, ecological and institutional 
factors determines whether trade is overall “good” or “bad” for welfare, or whether it will lead to 
conservation of stocks  and biodiversity.   It  follows that policy options and recommendations also 
change  considerably  with  the  complexity  of  trade  and  environmental  issues.    Moreover,  strict 
adherence to an “anti” or “pro” free trade stance seems less defensible when fuller consideration is 
given  to  the  wider  ecological  and  economic  linkages  underpinning  trade,  renewable  resource 
management and biodiversity impacts. 
  Future research in this field is likely to lead to further developments in a number of areas.  
First, all the papers of this symposium are concerned with optimal market regulation and trade policy.  
However, markets in many resource-rich countries that are also relatively poor may be incomplete, and 
regulation of any markets provides opportunities for lobbying, rent seeking and corruption.  Exploring 
these factors may be important for understanding how trade influences the incentives for resource 
management  and  biodiversity  conservation.    Second,  the  five  papers  examine  a  broad  range  of 
institutional contexts and market interactions beyond a simple consideration of optimal management   12
and open access.  Equally, we have seen how the current trade and renewable resource literature is 
increasingly  concerned  with  endogenous  institutions,  notably  the  decision  to  control  poaching 
activities.    Further  work  is  likely  to  explore  how  a  broad  range  of  market  and  institutional 
arrangements may develop along with expanding trade and markets in renewable resource products.  
Finally, renewable resources and biodiversity are not uniformly distributed, yet existing models do not 
address  this  implication  other  than  in  the  aggregate  designation  of  resource  or  biodiversity  “rich” 
countries and environments.  Recent theoretical advances indicate how economic geography affects 
trade and development patterns generally, and we should also expect that such consideration should 
influence the relationship between trade, renewable resource management and biodiversity.   13
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Notes 
                                                 
1 For example, two recent surveys on renewable resource management do not mention linkages with trade [4,21]. 
2 An economic interpretation of the “anti-free trade” view is espoused by Daly and Goodland [8], who suggest that this 
view centers around concerns about economic scale relative to ecological limits, distribution, the balance of power between 
multinational enterprises and national governments, and the implied effects of globalization on incentives for domestic 
governments to regulate resource use.  The conventional economic view on trade-environment linkages is summarized by 
Ulph [20]. 
3 In the limited space of this introduction, we are able only to provide a brief overview of developments in this literature 
through a few examples.  For a more detailed overview of the literature on trade, renewable resources and biodiversity, see 
Bulte and Barbier [5]. 
4 In an extension to Brander and Taylor [2], Hannesson [10] demonstrates that, with diminishing returns to manufacturing, 
moving from an open access regime to optimal management may or may not lead to an improvement in welfare.  Such an 
"immiserizing effect" of a transition from open access to optimal management will occur if the demand for the resource 
good is inelastic so that the value of harvested output is less with optimal management than under open access and more 
labor is withdrawn from the resource sector.  The imperfection that drives this result is that insiders in the manufacturing 
sector cannot prevent outsiders (formerly harvesting the resource) from spilling into “their sector”, adversely affecting the 
return to their labor.  The latter effect is also important to the results obtained by Hotte et al. [12], discussed below. 
5 While Chichilnisky [6] considers property rights to be absent in the South but fully enforced in the North, Karp et al. 
[13,14] assume imperfect property rights in both regions, but with the degree of imperfection conditional on population 
densities and thus assumed higher in the South. 
 